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Pricing of integrated-services networks.

Wang, Qiong.

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Pricing of integrated-services networks.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Pricing of integrated-services networks./
作者:	Wang, Qiong.
面頁冊數:	145 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-08, Section: B, page: 4376.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International59-08B.
標題:	Engineering, Industrial. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9900500
ISBN:	0591974428

Pricing of integrated-services networks.
Wang, Qiong.

Pricing of integrated-services networks. - 145 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-08, Section: B, page: 4376.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Carnegie Mellon University, 1998.

In this thesis, we develop a profit-maximizing, usage-based pricing framework for integrated-services networks, and study its profit and consumer welfare implications. By solving an optimal pricing model, we prove that setting optimal prices for network services are similar to that for tangible products, except marginal production costs are replaced by the marginal opportunity costs. We derive opportunity costs as functions of shadow prices of consuming network capacity at different times and service characteristics, such as performance objectives, average data rates, and expected call duration.

ISBN: 0591974428Subjects--Topical Terms:

626639
Engineering, Industrial.

Pricing of integrated-services networks.
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520 $a In this thesis, we develop a profit-maximizing, usage-based pricing framework for integrated-services networks, and study its profit and consumer welfare implications. By solving an optimal pricing model, we prove that setting optimal prices for network services are similar to that for tangible products, except marginal production costs are replaced by the marginal opportunity costs. We derive opportunity costs as functions of shadow prices of consuming network capacity at different times and service characteristics, such as performance objectives, average data rates, and expected call duration.
520 $a We show that under this pricing framework, the carrier always has the incentive to integrate multiple services into a single network. Service integration benefits some consumers because of economies of scale and more sharing in using network capacity. Nevertheless, service integration can be detrimental to other consumers. We demonstrate that those who use a service during off-peak hours are not better-off when the service is offered with other services in the same network. There are also cases where offering one service with a more efficient technology hurts users of another service.
520 $a We show that the optimal pricing framework can create resale opportunities, and discuss whether a regulator should require the carrier to allow resale. Our analysis suggests that the regulator can not always rely on resale as a way to break monopoly and improve consumer benefits. For example, resale causes the price of the service bought by resellers to increase, thereby hurts the ordinary users of the service. In some cases, the loss of consumer surplus of that service can exceed user benefits of all other services, so total consumer surplus decreases. Resale can also sometimes be used by the carrier as a way of price discrimination, which increases its profit at the expense of consumers. In those situations, to protect consumer interests, a regulator should disallow rather than require resale. Even in cases when resale benefits users of inelastic demand and increases total consumer surplus, it still hurts users of the service with elastic demand. Therefore, whether or not to require resale depends on the regulator's preference towards users of different services.
520 $a We discuss different ways of implementing the optimal pricing framework to best-effort service, and compare state-dependent pricing, under which the price is varied according to instantaneous network congestion status, with the long-term average pricing, under which the price is set according to expected packet arrival rate and capacity availability. Our simulation results show that while state-dependent pricing achieves a higher revenue and social welfare than long-term average pricing, in some cases, it leads to lower consumer surplus because it allows the carrier to better discriminate between traffic for which users are willing to pay less and traffic for which users are willing to pay more. Such a trade-off between profit and consumer benefits is most likely to happen when the network is more congested and/or when consumer demand is more inelastic.
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