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Essays in economics of organization.

Mukherjee, Arijit.

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Essays in economics of organization.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in economics of organization./
Author:	Mukherjee, Arijit.
Description:	227 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0282.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-01A.
Subject:	Economics, Commerce-Business. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3200995
ISBN:	9780542487231

Essays in economics of organization.
Mukherjee, Arijit.

Essays in economics of organization. - 227 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0282.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2005.

This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the optimal disclosure of information in different settings related to economics of organization. Chapter I focuses on sequential contracting with multiple employers. When a worker is raided, the initial employer may have an informational advantage over the raiders. If the worker has career concerns, and firm-worker matching is important, strategic disclosure of this information influences incentives and matching efficiency. Under long-term complete contracts (commitment to future wages and severance payments), perfect competition in the raider market ensures full information disclosure. In contrast, an optimal short-term contract induces full disclosure if (i) the worker is risk neutral, (ii) the worker does not face any liquidity constraints, and (iii) the raider market is perfectly competitive. Full disclosure may not be optimal if any of the above conditions is relaxed.

ISBN: 9780542487231Subjects--Topical Terms:

626649
Economics, Commerce-Business.

Essays in economics of organization.
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100 1 $a Mukherjee, Arijit. $3 1924270
245 1 0 $a Essays in economics of organization.
300 $a 227 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0282.
500 $a Adviser: Michael E. Whinston.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2005.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the optimal disclosure of information in different settings related to economics of organization. Chapter I focuses on sequential contracting with multiple employers. When a worker is raided, the initial employer may have an informational advantage over the raiders. If the worker has career concerns, and firm-worker matching is important, strategic disclosure of this information influences incentives and matching efficiency. Under long-term complete contracts (commitment to future wages and severance payments), perfect competition in the raider market ensures full information disclosure. In contrast, an optimal short-term contract induces full disclosure if (i) the worker is risk neutral, (ii) the worker does not face any liquidity constraints, and (iii) the raider market is perfectly competitive. Full disclosure may not be optimal if any of the above conditions is relaxed.
520 $a In chapter 2, I study the optimal information disclosure by a firm when it can combine career concerns incentives with relational contracts. If relational contracts substitute career concerns incentives, combining the two incentives is suboptimal, and the optimal disclosure policy follows a cut-off rule where a patient firm opts for opaqueness. In contrast, if these incentives are complements, transparency can be optimal even for a patient firm who combines the two incentives. In the presence of raids and firm specific matching, the set of discount factors that supports transparency increases with the matching gains.
520 $a Chapter 3, a joint work with Scott Stern, develops an overlapping-generations model of cumulative research to analyze the conditions supporting Open Science as an economic institution. While secrecy yields private returns that are independent of the actions of future generations, the benefits to disclosure depend in part on the use of disclosed knowledge by subsequent researchers. Potential equilibria include 'Open Science,' 'Secrecy,' and a cyclic structure where periods of Open Science are followed by Secrecy. The feasibility of Open Science depends on parameters such as the costs of accessing prior knowledge, and the relative benefits to private exploitation under secrecy versus disclosure. If both Open Science and Secrecy can be supported, Open Science is associated with a higher level of social welfare.
590 $a School code: 0163.
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790 $a 0163
791 $a Ph.D.
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3200995