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How animals see the world: A theory...

Nanay, Bence.

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How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states./
作者:	Nanay, Bence.
面頁冊數:	205 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3010.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-08A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3228436
ISBN:	9780542826009

How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states.
Nanay, Bence.

How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states. - 205 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3010.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.

When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or as affording some other action? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object affords a certain action is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as affording actions, and do not just believe that they do. I call these perceptual states that represent objects as affording certain actions action-oriented perceptual states.

ISBN: 9780542826009Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states.
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245 1 0 $a How animals see the world: A theory of content for action-oriented perceptual states.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3010.
500 $a Adviser: John Searle.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
520 $a When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or as affording some other action? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object affords a certain action is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as affording actions, and do not just believe that they do. I call these perceptual states that represent objects as affording certain actions action-oriented perceptual states.
520 $a These perceptual states are very basic---both evolutionarily and from a developmental point of view. Nonhuman animals and small children can be in action-oriented perceptual states---this is perhaps the only kind of mental state they can be in. Moreover, human adults are in action-oriented perceptual states more often than usually assumed. These states are necessary for being motivated to perform certain actions. In order for an agent to be motivated to perform an action Q with respect to (on, with, with the help of) an object, she must see this object as Q-able; as affording Q. The main aim of the dissertation is to explain the content of these perceptual states.
520 $a It is also examined how action-oriented perceptual states are altered when we see something as affording an action not to us, but to someone else. This phenomenon may play a crucial role in character engagement---both in real life and in looking at a visual work of art.
520 $a If we want to understand how the mind works, we need to start with explaining relatively simple mental states and on the basis of this explanation proceed to explain complex ones. The aim of my dissertation is to take the first step and explain the relatively simple and basic action-oriented perceptual states. If successful, this analysis can provide a stepping stone for the explanation of the more complex, linguistic, abstract human thoughts.
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