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In sickness and in health: Unintende...

Marks, Mindy Sue.

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In sickness and in health: Unintended consequences in the American health insurance system.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	In sickness and in health: Unintended consequences in the American health insurance system./
作者:	Marks, Mindy Sue.
面頁冊數:	119 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-07, Section: A, page: 2693.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-07A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3139858
ISBN:	9780496869992

In sickness and in health: Unintended consequences in the American health insurance system.
Marks, Mindy Sue.

In sickness and in health: Unintended consequences in the American health insurance system. - 119 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-07, Section: A, page: 2693.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University in St. Louis, 2004.

Chapter one of the dissertation provides background on America's complicated health care system where eligibility for subsidized health insurance depends on employment, spouses' employment, employer characteristics, family income and family structure. The idiosyncratic nature of the health care system almost guarantees that unintended consequences will arise from the interactions between individual choices, health insurance availability and government intervention. This chapter addresses some of these unintended consequences, while chapters two and three provide case studies.

ISBN: 9780496869992Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

In sickness and in health: Unintended consequences in the American health insurance system.
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500 $a Chair: Paul Rothstein.
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520 $a Chapter one of the dissertation provides background on America's complicated health care system where eligibility for subsidized health insurance depends on employment, spouses' employment, employer characteristics, family income and family structure. The idiosyncratic nature of the health care system almost guarantees that unintended consequences will arise from the interactions between individual choices, health insurance availability and government intervention. This chapter addresses some of these unintended consequences, while chapters two and three provide case studies.
520 $a Chapter two examines whether health and access to health insurance impact the decisions to marry and divorce. I argue that individuals in ill health face difficulties on the marriage market. Furthermore, since sickness during marriage is an unanticipated shock that reduces the size of the marriage surplus, sickness should contribute to divorce. Finally, I investigate if access to subsidized health insurance through marriage affects the probability of divorce. Proportional hazard models estimated on panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth indicate that ill health increases the time until first marriage. Furthermore, illnesses that were present at the time of marriage have no impact on divorce but health shocks that occur during the marriage increase the propensity to divorce for nonblack men. When the source of health insurance is added to the analysis it appears that sick women remain married to keep health insurance from their spouse's employer and are more likely to divorce when doing so would enable them to qualify for Medicaid.
520 $a Chapter three investigates the relationship between the minimum wage, employer-provided health insurance and part-time labor. I argue that minimum wages prevent the tradeoff of wages for benefits and result in lower rates of subsidized employer-provided health insurance. Additionally, increasing the minimum wages creates an incentive to hire more part-time workers who can be excluded from the firm's health insurance plan. The essay uses the 1988--1993 Current Population Surveys and exploits cross-state and federal variation in minimum wages. I find that higher minimum wages reduce the receipt of employer-provided health insurance, particularly for low-income workers. Furthermore firms, governed by the nondiscrimination law, switch to part-time workers who can be denied health insurance.
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