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Essays on organizational design.

Saouma, Richard Edouard.

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Essays on organizational design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on organizational design./
作者:	Saouma, Richard Edouard.
面頁冊數:	161 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1625.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219369
ISBN:	9780542708039

Essays on organizational design.
Saouma, Richard Edouard.

Essays on organizational design. - 161 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1625.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2006.

We examine organizational design in three different settings. In the first setting, we examine the optimal level of asymmetric information between an informed manager and an uninformed principal. We find that the principal's profitability is non-monotonic in the manager's private information. In the second setting, we examine an outsourcing decision and show that outsourcing to a supplier is optimal when the cost of the task being outsoucced is significant, and the supplier can shoulder large liabilities without additional compensation. The final setting studies the efficiency of an auction to allocate a scare resource within a firm. We find that the auction yields approximately 90% of the profits available under the optimal second-best mechanism.

ISBN: 9780542708039Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Essays on organizational design.
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