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History, expectation, and market out...

Zhang, Juanjuan.

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History, expectation, and market outcomes.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	History, expectation, and market outcomes./
作者:	Zhang, Juanjuan.
面頁冊數:	158 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3077.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-08A.
標題:	Business Administration, Marketing. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3228536
ISBN:	9780542827136

History, expectation, and market outcomes.
Zhang, Juanjuan.

History, expectation, and market outcomes. - 158 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3077.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.

This dissertation studies how the history and expectation of individual behaviors determine market outcomes. One's behavior may be influenced by others' past behaviors, by her expectation of others' future behaviors, and by her understanding that others may as well have based their decisions upon the past and the expectation of her own behaviors. This dissertation employs empirical, analytical and behavioral methodologies to examine the role of history, expectation, and the interplay between the two.

ISBN: 9780542827136Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017573
Business Administration, Marketing.

History, expectation, and market outcomes.
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245 1 0 $a History, expectation, and market outcomes.
300 $a 158 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3077.
500 $a Advisers: Teck H. Ho; J. Miguel Villas-Boas.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
520 $a This dissertation studies how the history and expectation of individual behaviors determine market outcomes. One's behavior may be influenced by others' past behaviors, by her expectation of others' future behaviors, and by her understanding that others may as well have based their decisions upon the past and the expectation of her own behaviors. This dissertation employs empirical, analytical and behavioral methodologies to examine the role of history, expectation, and the interplay between the two.
520 $a First, it models the process through which consumers learn the desirability of their choice alternatives by observing their peer decision-makers' choice history. Empirical evidence comes from renal-disease patients who take turns to decide whether to accept a kidney for transplantation. A patient lowers her quality evaluation for a kidney once it has been refused by an earlier patient and becomes more inclined to reject herself. Her refusal, in turn, triggers more refusals down the queue. Kidneys are overly rejected compared with the social optimum where people share their private information.
520 $a Second; the role of expectation is studied in a channel setting where the manufacturer offers the retailer a resell contract, anticipating the retailer's response. The contract can be either a quantity discount stipulating declining average prices or its equivalent two-part tariff that charges the retailer a fixed fee and a uniform unit price. The fixed fee is perceived by retailers as loss and the subsequent contribution margin as gain. Expecting retailer loss-aversion, the manufacturer lowers the fixed fee but raises the wholesale price, at the cost of channel efficiency.
520 $a Finally the interplay between history and expectation is analytically modeled in a dynamic setting where firms design products based on consumer purchase history which, in turn, depends upon consumers' expectation of firms' product strategies. In equilibrium, competing firms offer different designs to consumers sporting different purchase histories, while simultaneous customization intensifies competition. Expecting this dilemma, firms prefer having one occupy the early period market, but would compete to be this market leader. With sufficient firm patience and consumer myopia, a market leader emerges. Otherwise firms split the early market where firm patience and consumer myopia intensifies competition.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Marketing. $3 1017573
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Health Sciences, Medicine and Surgery. $3 1017756
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710 2 0 $a University of California, Berkeley. $3 687832
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-08A.
790 1 0 $a Ho, Teck H., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, $e advisor
790 $a 0028
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3228536