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Psychology, preferences, and markets.

Benjamin, Daniel Jacob.

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Psychology, preferences, and markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Psychology, preferences, and markets./
作者:	Benjamin, Daniel Jacob.
面頁冊數:	231 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1826.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3217677
ISBN:	9780542691942

Psychology, preferences, and markets.
Benjamin, Daniel Jacob.

Psychology, preferences, and markets. - 231 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1826.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2006.

In the first paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high school students shows that small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores, although anomalies persist even among the highest-scoring individuals. A laboratory experiment shows that reducing cognitive resources using a "cognitive load" manipulation tends to exacerbate small-stakes risk aversion, with similar but statistically weaker effects on short-run impatience. Explicit reasoning about choice seems to reduce the prevalence of these anomalies, especially among the less skilled. Survey evidence suggests that the role of cognitive ability may extend to adult behaviors that are related to small-stakes risk preference and short-run time preference.

ISBN: 9780542691942Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Psychology, preferences, and markets.
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300 $a 231 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1826.
500 $a Adviser: David I. Laibson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2006.
520 $a In the first paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high school students shows that small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores, although anomalies persist even among the highest-scoring individuals. A laboratory experiment shows that reducing cognitive resources using a "cognitive load" manipulation tends to exacerbate small-stakes risk aversion, with similar but statistically weaker effects on short-run impatience. Explicit reasoning about choice seems to reduce the prevalence of these anomalies, especially among the less skilled. Survey evidence suggests that the role of cognitive ability may extend to adult behaviors that are related to small-stakes risk preference and short-run time preference.
520 $a In the second paper, we construct a measure of gubernatorial candidates' personal appeal by showing 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asking them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, personal factors as measured in our study significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status.
520 $a The last essay is a work-in-progress that is currently undergoing extensive revision. I propose a theory of fairness preferences based on two principles, each consistent with extensive laboratory and survey evidence. First, parties' outcomes from a transaction enter an agent's utility function as perfect complements. Second, when judging fairness, the agent evaluates parties' payoffs from the transaction at hand relative to payoffs from a "reference transaction" (assumed to be recently-experienced terms of exchange). The reference transaction sets a benchmark for what is fair. I analyze labor contracting when workers have such fairness preferences. The model parsimoniously predicts a variety of labor market regularities.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
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710 2 0 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3217677