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Three essays in investment banking.

Hrnjic, Emir.

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Three essays in investment banking.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays in investment banking./
作者:	Hrnjic, Emir.
面頁冊數:	128 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-03, Section: A, page: 0999.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-03A.
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3210866
ISBN:	9780542608896

Three essays in investment banking.
Hrnjic, Emir.

Three essays in investment banking. - 128 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-03, Section: A, page: 0999.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tulane University, 2005.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that underwriters prefer long-term investors among IPO investors and academic research has shown that long-term ownership improves value of the firm. Nevertheless, academic research has focused on initial allocation to IPO investors without considering effects of long-term holdings. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that underpricing of IPO firms is compensation for the regular investors who reveal the true information about the IPO firm during the bookbuilding process. Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) find that initial allocations to institutions have positive impact on offer price revisions, but they appear to be too large to be explained only by information gathering. We present game theory model and empirical evidence that underpricing is given as compensation for long-term holdings. The compensation is made in two-installments; the flipping revenues, and the capital gains in the future sale of the allocation remainder. We find that long term holding by institutional investors is large, positively correlated with revisions of the offer price, showing that it adds value, and positively correlated with underpricing, showing that institutions get larger allocations of more underpriced offerings to cover their larger monitoring cost.

ISBN: 9780542608896Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Three essays in investment banking.
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520 $a Anecdotal evidence suggests that underwriters prefer long-term investors among IPO investors and academic research has shown that long-term ownership improves value of the firm. Nevertheless, academic research has focused on initial allocation to IPO investors without considering effects of long-term holdings. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that underpricing of IPO firms is compensation for the regular investors who reveal the true information about the IPO firm during the bookbuilding process. Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) find that initial allocations to institutions have positive impact on offer price revisions, but they appear to be too large to be explained only by information gathering. We present game theory model and empirical evidence that underpricing is given as compensation for long-term holdings. The compensation is made in two-installments; the flipping revenues, and the capital gains in the future sale of the allocation remainder. We find that long term holding by institutional investors is large, positively correlated with revisions of the offer price, showing that it adds value, and positively correlated with underpricing, showing that institutions get larger allocations of more underpriced offerings to cover their larger monitoring cost.
520 $a Despite significance of Investment Banks in financial world, governance of investment banks is largely unexamined. Academic studies of governance are ambivalent and often contradictory. Samples of firms from different industries pool firms with heterogeneous governance structures, which can confound empirical estimates of relationships among governance characteristics. Most governance characteristics are endogenous. We apply the novel method that uses external measures of governance: CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, stock returns, competition in product markets, and disciplinary pressure from corporate control market, in order to assess the governance of investment banks. We conclude that banks are well governed over sample period.
520 $a We also examine whether there is a transfer of private information when investment bank is related to both sides of M&A transaction. We find that acquirer's announcement returns are higher when its advisor was involved with target. Target announcement returns are not affected. Overall evidence suggests that previous relationship is not harmful to any side in the transaction and is likely beneficial to acquirers.
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