東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Why do managers meet or slightly bea...

Feng, Mei.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium?/
作者:	Feng, Mei.
面頁冊數:	152 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 2992.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-08A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3186625
ISBN:	9780542299612

Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium?
Feng, Mei.

Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium? - 152 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 2992.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2005.

This study investigates whether and why corporate managers have incentives to meet or slightly beat their own earnings forecasts, and how these incentives are related to their meeting or slightly beating analysts' earnings forecasts. The paper first documents that the frequency of zero and small positive management forecast errors is more than three times the frequency of small negative management forecast errors, consistent with managers having incentives to meet or slightly beat their own forecasts. Next, the paper explains these incentives by developing a formal model in which zero and small positive forecast errors signal that managers have more accurate private information regarding investment opportunities. The accurate information allows managers to select profitable investment projects and consequently increases firm value. Before empirically testing the model, the study provides evidence that analysts follow management forecasts closely and therefore that analysts' forecasts reflect managers' private information. This indicates that the model of managers' private information can be used to explain managers' incentives to meet or slightly beat both managers' and analysts' forecasts. Finally, the paper presents new empirical findings on managers' and analysts' forecasts that are consistent with the model. Specifically, firms that meet or slightly beat managers' or analysts' earnings forecasts perform better in the future; their managers attain a higher reputation and incorporate more private information in the earnings forecasts.

ISBN: 9780542299612Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium?
LDR:02430nmm 2200265 4500 001 1826723
005 20061215124246.5
008 130610s2005 eng d
020 $a 9780542299612
035 $a (UnM)AAI3186625
035 $a AAI3186625
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Feng, Mei. $3 1915678
245 1 0 $a Why do managers meet or slightly beat earnings forecasts in equilibrium?
300 $a 152 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 2992.
500 $a Chair: Douglas J. Skinner.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2005.
520 $a This study investigates whether and why corporate managers have incentives to meet or slightly beat their own earnings forecasts, and how these incentives are related to their meeting or slightly beating analysts' earnings forecasts. The paper first documents that the frequency of zero and small positive management forecast errors is more than three times the frequency of small negative management forecast errors, consistent with managers having incentives to meet or slightly beat their own forecasts. Next, the paper explains these incentives by developing a formal model in which zero and small positive forecast errors signal that managers have more accurate private information regarding investment opportunities. The accurate information allows managers to select profitable investment projects and consequently increases firm value. Before empirically testing the model, the study provides evidence that analysts follow management forecasts closely and therefore that analysts' forecasts reflect managers' private information. This indicates that the model of managers' private information can be used to explain managers' incentives to meet or slightly beat both managers' and analysts' forecasts. Finally, the paper presents new empirical findings on managers' and analysts' forecasts that are consistent with the model. Specifically, firms that meet or slightly beat managers' or analysts' earnings forecasts perform better in the future; their managers attain a higher reputation and incorporate more private information in the earnings forecasts.
590 $a School code: 0127.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
690 $a 0272
710 2 0 $a University of Michigan. $3 777416
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-08A.
790 1 0 $a Skinner, Douglas J., $e advisor
790 $a 0127
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3186625