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An economic theory of political coll...

Padovano, Fabio.

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An economic theory of political collusion and government growth.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	An economic theory of political collusion and government growth./
Author:	Padovano, Fabio.
Description:	108 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 56-05, Section: A, page: 1922.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International56-05A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9531258

An economic theory of political collusion and government growth.
Padovano, Fabio.

An economic theory of political collusion and government growth. - 108 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 56-05, Section: A, page: 1922.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 1995.

This dissertation elaborates a testable theory of political collusion and oligarchic government. Chapter 1 reviews the public choice, industrial organization and political science literature on collusion and oligarchies. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the incentives to compete engendered in the electoral process are not sufficient to prevent parties from colluding. A trigger strategy equilibrium game shows that, even in an environment deliberately biased to yield median-voter type of results, politicians take advantage of the time interval that separates the elections to become unresponsive to the electorate. After the elections, parties will collude until a critical time when, as the new elections draw near, they all revert to a competitive behavior. Collusion among political parties generates a political business cycle whose magnitude is positively related to the number of parties in the cartel. Parties' ability to collude depends on their number, time preferences and on the political market conditions.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

An economic theory of political collusion and government growth.
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008 130610s1995 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI9531258
035 $a AAI9531258
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Padovano, Fabio. $3 898758
245 1 3 $a An economic theory of political collusion and government growth.
300 $a 108 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 56-05, Section: A, page: 1922.
500 $a Director: Tyler Cowen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 1995.
520 $a This dissertation elaborates a testable theory of political collusion and oligarchic government. Chapter 1 reviews the public choice, industrial organization and political science literature on collusion and oligarchies. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the incentives to compete engendered in the electoral process are not sufficient to prevent parties from colluding. A trigger strategy equilibrium game shows that, even in an environment deliberately biased to yield median-voter type of results, politicians take advantage of the time interval that separates the elections to become unresponsive to the electorate. After the elections, parties will collude until a critical time when, as the new elections draw near, they all revert to a competitive behavior. Collusion among political parties generates a political business cycle whose magnitude is positively related to the number of parties in the cartel. Parties' ability to collude depends on their number, time preferences and on the political market conditions.
520 $a Chapter 3 investigates the nature of the collusive agreement among political parties. Parties organize the cartel so that each of them specializes in the supply of a specific set of political "rent". Parties become monopolists in the supply of their rent and develop "spheres of influence." The development of spheres of influence maximizes parties' profits from politics and increases the stability of the cartel. The model adopts Abreu's (1988) theory of optimal punishment to derive the political market's contestability conditions in a variety of situations.
520 $a Chapter 4 employs the model of oligarchic government to explain the progressive expansion of the public sectors of modern economies. Government growth could be a cartel enforcement strategy. If profits from politics are positively related to the size of the political market, parties are less incentivated to defect today if they know that, by doing so, they will be excluded from a larger amount of profits tomorrow. Parties' ability to collude is also inversely related to the time series and cross sectoral correlation of the shocks in the demand for political rents.
590 $a School code: 0883.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0615
710 2 0 $a George Mason University. $3 1019450
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 56-05A.
790 1 0 $a Cowen, Tyler, $e advisor
790 $a 0883
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1995
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9531258