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What matters more for CEO turnover: ...

Dai, Zhonglan.

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What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk?/
作者:	Dai, Zhonglan.
面頁冊數:	51 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-09, Section: A, page: 3357.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-09A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3190235
ISBN:	9780542339479

What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk?
Dai, Zhonglan.

What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk? - 51 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-09, Section: A, page: 3357.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2005.

This study investigates a firm's optimal CEO firing decision and its subsequent effect on CEO compensation in a dynamic model with moral hazard and learning. Based on perceived CEO talent, I explicitly solve for the cutoff point below which a firm will fire its CEO and show that the cutoff depends on variance of assessed talent. As a result, CEO turnover depends on both CEO performance and variance of his performance. Using risk as a proxy for variance of CEO talent, I find empirically that risk, not firm's past accounting or stock price performance, has the most significant impact on CEO turnover. Further, it is the firm-specific risk, not the market risk which affects the CEO turnover decision. I also find that after controlling for the risk, there exists a trade-off between the first two moments of stock price performance in CEO turnover decision. In addition, I solve for the optimal linear compensation contract and compare pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) over CEO's tenure (as well as across different firms) to examine how the pressure from firing affects the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Empirical results from accounting earnings show that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is smaller for CEOs who face larger firing pressures. This is consistent with the model predictions. However, the empirical results from stock returns are not statistically significant.

ISBN: 9780542339479Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk?
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