東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

New institutionalist essays on colle...

Spreeuw, Darren Louis.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives./
作者:	Spreeuw, Darren Louis.
面頁冊數:	175 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-09, Section: A, page: 3587.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International59-09A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9907815
ISBN:	0599056487

New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives.
Spreeuw, Darren Louis.

New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives. - 175 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-09, Section: A, page: 3587.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 1998.

With the collapse of the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, agricultural production cooperatives have emerged and flourished despite the theoretical problems of such organizational forms, mainly incentive problems that induce workers to shirk--to "free-ride." This dissertation utilizes adapted models of collective action to explain how cooperatives have overcome problems of free-riding with regard to labor effort provision.

ISBN: 0599056487Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives.
LDR:03340nmm 2200325 4500 001 1819797
005 20061006142511.5
008 130610s1998 eng d
020 $a 0599056487
035 $a (UnM)AAI9907815
035 $a AAI9907815
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Spreeuw, Darren Louis. $3 1909061
245 1 0 $a New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives.
300 $a 175 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-09, Section: A, page: 3587.
500 $a Chair: Mieke Meurs.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 1998.
520 $a With the collapse of the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, agricultural production cooperatives have emerged and flourished despite the theoretical problems of such organizational forms, mainly incentive problems that induce workers to shirk--to "free-ride." This dissertation utilizes adapted models of collective action to explain how cooperatives have overcome problems of free-riding with regard to labor effort provision.
520 $a In the first essay, the model shows how villagers facing this collective action problem may utilize peer-monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to create incentives within the cooperative that control free-riding. These institutions allow cooperative members to gather important information regarding the work efforts of fellow members, and such information affects the strategies and actions available within the game theoretic model. Further, peer monitoring and enforcement are facilitated by high levels of social cohesion--equality, a shared history of collective action, and repeated interactions within dense social networks. By modeling these institutions into a game that takes place over time, players have access to information from previous periods, and can formulate conditional strategies--"I will cooperate if you cooperate." Within the model, the game structure need not be that of the "prisoner's dilemma," as presented by past models of collective action. The model is empirically tested by case study data collected during a nine month Fulbright Fellowship in Bulgaria.
520 $a In the second essay, altruistic preferences are added to the model, which shows how villagers facing this collective action problem may be able to draw on shared group affiliations to limit free riding. The model hypothesizes that in villages where equality and a shared history have created a cohesive community, the preferences of an individual cooperative member may be affected by the welfare of other members. With altruism included into member utility functions, members may have incentives to provide higher levels of labor effort to the cooperative. Altruistic preferences, promoted in a cohesive community, can change the theoretical game from a prisoner's dilemma to a game where cooperation is more probable.
520 $a The third essay is a historical study of the state's support for the institutional transplant of Raiffeisen credit cooperatives in Bulgaria.
590 $a School code: 0008.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0510
710 2 0 $a The American University. $3 1017567
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 59-09A.
790 1 0 $a Meurs, Mieke, $e advisor
790 $a 0008
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9907815