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Cooperation and conflict: Self-enfo...

Leeson, Peter T.

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Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents./
Author:	Leeson, Peter T.
Description:	100 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0267.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-01A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3160506
ISBN:	0496939750

Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents.
Leeson, Peter T.

Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents. - 100 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0267.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2005.

This dissertation examines the robustness of private institutions used to illicit good conduct where government is absent. I consider cases in which the threat of multilateral punishment in the context of repeated play---the traditional solution to problems that confront trade under anarchy---cannot support cooperation. These cases include the presence of large, socially heterogeneous populations, in which the information transmission mechanism required for reputation to work breaks down, and the presence of immobile, permanently weak individuals whose stationarity prevents them from successfully boycotting bad types and whose permanent weakness prevents them from defending themselves against permanently stronger agents. Despite the inability of multilateral punishment to secure cooperation under these conditions, I show how alternative mechanisms of self-enforcing exchange emerge to facilitate trade in these cases instead. I use historical examples ranging from medieval international trade to late pre-colonial Africa to illustrate my arguments.

ISBN: 0496939750Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents.
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100 1 $a Leeson, Peter T. $3 1905542
245 1 0 $a Cooperation and conflict: Self-enforcing exchange among socially heterogeneous agents.
300 $a 100 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0267.
500 $a Director: Peter J. Boettke.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2005.
520 $a This dissertation examines the robustness of private institutions used to illicit good conduct where government is absent. I consider cases in which the threat of multilateral punishment in the context of repeated play---the traditional solution to problems that confront trade under anarchy---cannot support cooperation. These cases include the presence of large, socially heterogeneous populations, in which the information transmission mechanism required for reputation to work breaks down, and the presence of immobile, permanently weak individuals whose stationarity prevents them from successfully boycotting bad types and whose permanent weakness prevents them from defending themselves against permanently stronger agents. Despite the inability of multilateral punishment to secure cooperation under these conditions, I show how alternative mechanisms of self-enforcing exchange emerge to facilitate trade in these cases instead. I use historical examples ranging from medieval international trade to late pre-colonial Africa to illustrate my arguments.
590 $a School code: 0883.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
690 $a 0501
710 2 0 $a George Mason University. $3 1019450
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-01A.
790 1 0 $a Boettke, Peter J., $e advisor
790 $a 0883
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3160506