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The Perils of Third-Party Counterins...

Simpson, Erin Marie.

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The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns./
作者:	Simpson, Erin Marie.
面頁冊數:	136 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: 0363.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-01A.
標題:	Political Science, International Relations. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3435578
ISBN:	9781124340517

The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns.
Simpson, Erin Marie.

The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns. - 136 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: 0363.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.

What explains the paucity of victory among states fighting counterinsurgency campaigns overseas?

ISBN: 9781124340517Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669648
Political Science, International Relations.

The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: 0363.
500 $a Adviser: Stephen Peter Rosen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.
520 $a What explains the paucity of victory among states fighting counterinsurgency campaigns overseas?
520 $a Guerrilla strategies are regarded by many in the West as universally successful. But while rebels fighting as insurgents do have somewhat higher odds of success than those adopting other strategies, states fighting what many would refer to as traditional civil wars still defeat insurgents well over 70% of the time. However, states fighting insurgents overseas have rather less luck. Here the trend is markedly reversed and creates something of a paradox: while many third-party states enjoy significant resource advantages over their indigenous counterparts, they are very rarely able to translate that material superiority into political victories in counterinsurgency campaigns. In the empirical analysis offered below, I find only six instances of outright third-party victories over insurgent opponents.
520 $a How then do states defeat insurgent opponents? And, more specifically, how do third parties fighting overseas conduct counterinsurgency campaigns? Relying on a dense review of the secondary literature and developing novel data for regression analysis, I argue the answer ultimately lies in the intersection of selection effects and intelligence: third parties only face the most resolved insurgents and typically in unfavorable information environments. This then limits both their war-fighting and war-termination strategies. The availability of intelligence is in many ways what distinguishes states fighting indigenous insurgencies from those third parties or colonial powers fighting overseas. Ultimately, I argue that third parties win when they're able to overcome these intelligence challenges before public support runs out. This typically requires rather substantial military reforms and complex deal-making with local leaders. Unfortunately, the nature of selection effects in these cases gives rise to a population of insurgencies whereby these conditions are very unlikely to be met.
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