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The Institutional Choices of Politic...

Danesi, Silvina L.

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The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers./
Author:	Danesi, Silvina L.
Description:	401 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-05A.
Subject:	Latin American Studies. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR70817
ISBN:	9780494708170

The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers.
Danesi, Silvina L.

The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers. - 401 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Universite de Montreal (Canada), 2010.

This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions.

ISBN: 9780494708170Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669420
Latin American Studies.

The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers.
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008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780494708170
035 $a (UMI)AAINR70817
035 $a AAINR70817
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Danesi, Silvina L. $3 1681929
245 1 4 $a The Institutional Choices of Politicians How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers.
300 $a 401 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Universite de Montreal (Canada), 2010.
520 $a This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions.
520 $a The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor.
520 $a In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine's counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition.
520 $a The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked.
520 $a The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country's politics and a description of the Chambers' organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research. Keywords : Institutional design; institutional development; political parties; lower chambers; legislators; Cartel Theory; agenda control; Argentina; Chile.
590 $a School code: 0992.
650 4 $a Latin American Studies. $3 1669420
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0550
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a Universite de Montreal (Canada). $3 1018132
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-05A.
790 $a 0992
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR70817