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U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957...

Cherry, Philip Jason.

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U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison./
Author:	Cherry, Philip Jason.
Description:	59 p.
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 48-04, page: 2021.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International48-04.
Subject:	Political Science, International Relations. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1474901
ISBN:	9781109711936

U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison.
Cherry, Philip Jason.

U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison. - 59 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 48-04, page: 2021.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2010.

This paper tests the hypothesis that asymmetric intelligence liaison is damaging to the competitive advantage of the state that appears to be getting the most out of the arrangement. This is one facet of Jennifer Sims's theory of intelligence liaison and is based on the logic that while one state may be benefiting in the short term from such an association, in the long term this situation represents either institutionalized intelligence dependency or a miscalculation on the part of the superordinate state of the true costs of the liaison. The hypothesis was tested using the U.S. -- Iranian intelligence relationship from 1957 to 1979 as a case study. I found that the relationship was allowed to devolve from a relatively equal partnership to a situation where the U.S. was largely dependent on the Shah for its collection against the Soviet Union, and therefore asymmetric. Both actors responded as predicted by the theory, but without success from the U.S. perspective. This suggests several refinements to the theory, including the necessity of determining the value of liaison for a particular partner vis-a-vis the target of the intelligence relationship in calculations of symmetry, and also the danger presented by uniquely valuable collection assets to such calculations.

ISBN: 9781109711936Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669648
Political Science, International Relations.

U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison.
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020 $a 9781109711936
035 $a (UMI)AAI1474901
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Cherry, Philip Jason. $3 1679723
245 1 0 $a U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison.
300 $a 59 p.
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 48-04, page: 2021.
500 $a Adviser: Jennifer E. Sims.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2010.
520 $a This paper tests the hypothesis that asymmetric intelligence liaison is damaging to the competitive advantage of the state that appears to be getting the most out of the arrangement. This is one facet of Jennifer Sims's theory of intelligence liaison and is based on the logic that while one state may be benefiting in the short term from such an association, in the long term this situation represents either institutionalized intelligence dependency or a miscalculation on the part of the superordinate state of the true costs of the liaison. The hypothesis was tested using the U.S. -- Iranian intelligence relationship from 1957 to 1979 as a case study. I found that the relationship was allowed to devolve from a relatively equal partnership to a situation where the U.S. was largely dependent on the Shah for its collection against the Soviet Union, and therefore asymmetric. Both actors responded as predicted by the theory, but without success from the U.S. perspective. This suggests several refinements to the theory, including the necessity of determining the value of liaison for a particular partner vis-a-vis the target of the intelligence relationship in calculations of symmetry, and also the danger presented by uniquely valuable collection assets to such calculations.
590 $a School code: 0076.
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a Georgetown University. $b Security Studies. $3 1020357
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 48-04.
790 1 0 $a Sims, Jennifer E., $e advisor
790 $a 0076
791 $a M.A.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1474901