東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

The alliance market: American securi...

Kim, TongFi.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity .

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity ./
作者:	Kim, TongFi.
面頁冊數:	308 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4172.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-11A.
標題:	Political Science, International Relations. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3425388
ISBN:	9781124252032

The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity .
Kim, TongFi.

The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity . - 308 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4172.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2010.

With the traditional notion of military alliances as a tool for aggregating power, one cannot adequately explain such phenomena as the persistence of many Cold War alliances or the formation of large numbers of alliances in the post-Cold War era, which neither involves nor is aimed against the United States. This dissertation explains these phenomena by developing a theory about the market of military alliances. I conceptualize military alliances as contracts in which states pledge a continuous exchange of goods and services, at least one of which is the provision of military force, but where the others need not be. Contrary to the capability aggregation model of alliances, states often form and maintain an alliance with another state that is unable to provide military force for allied defense. This study views the alliance market from three different angles: systemic, contractual, and domestic. First, I discuss how the structure of the alliance market, defined by systemic polarity, affects relationships between allies. With a systemic model of alliances, I argue that the vice to which great powers easily succumb in a multipolar world is overreaction; in a bipolar world, overextension; and in a unipolar world, inattention. Next, I present a chapter on the contractual aspects of alliances, explaining one of the central roles of alliance agreements---the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. After pointing out some problems with the concept of entrapment, I argue that states carefully design alliance contracts so that they prevent entrapment while not diminishing the value of alliances by preventing entanglement altogether. Following that, in the chapter on the domestic level, I explain how domestic politics affect intra-alliance bargaining and demonstrate that a state sometimes loses profits (and gains voice) as a result of increased capability. Three factors, whether there is strong domestic opposition to an alliance, whether a leader is pro-alliance, and whether a leader is vulnerable, affect how much more a state gains from its alliance relative to the minimum benefit necessary to motivate the state to be in the alliance. For statistical analysis, I use the dataset of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions project. For case studies, I examine American alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain. The conclusion discusses implications of the market theory of alliances on international relations theory and policy of the United States and its allies.

ISBN: 9781124252032Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669648
Political Science, International Relations.

The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity .
LDR:03399nam 2200277 4500 001 1400497
005 20111010080607.5
008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124252032
035 $a (UMI)AAI3425388
035 $a AAI3425388
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Kim, TongFi. $3 1679559
245 1 4 $a The alliance market: American security relations under unipolarity .
300 $a 308 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4172.
500 $a Adviser: Randall Schweller.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2010.
520 $a With the traditional notion of military alliances as a tool for aggregating power, one cannot adequately explain such phenomena as the persistence of many Cold War alliances or the formation of large numbers of alliances in the post-Cold War era, which neither involves nor is aimed against the United States. This dissertation explains these phenomena by developing a theory about the market of military alliances. I conceptualize military alliances as contracts in which states pledge a continuous exchange of goods and services, at least one of which is the provision of military force, but where the others need not be. Contrary to the capability aggregation model of alliances, states often form and maintain an alliance with another state that is unable to provide military force for allied defense. This study views the alliance market from three different angles: systemic, contractual, and domestic. First, I discuss how the structure of the alliance market, defined by systemic polarity, affects relationships between allies. With a systemic model of alliances, I argue that the vice to which great powers easily succumb in a multipolar world is overreaction; in a bipolar world, overextension; and in a unipolar world, inattention. Next, I present a chapter on the contractual aspects of alliances, explaining one of the central roles of alliance agreements---the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. After pointing out some problems with the concept of entrapment, I argue that states carefully design alliance contracts so that they prevent entrapment while not diminishing the value of alliances by preventing entanglement altogether. Following that, in the chapter on the domestic level, I explain how domestic politics affect intra-alliance bargaining and demonstrate that a state sometimes loses profits (and gains voice) as a result of increased capability. Three factors, whether there is strong domestic opposition to an alliance, whether a leader is pro-alliance, and whether a leader is vulnerable, affect how much more a state gains from its alliance relative to the minimum benefit necessary to motivate the state to be in the alliance. For statistical analysis, I use the dataset of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions project. For case studies, I examine American alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain. The conclusion discusses implications of the market theory of alliances on international relations theory and policy of the United States and its allies.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Military Studies. $3 1017606
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0750
710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Political Science. $3 1675100
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-11A.
790 1 0 $a Schweller, Randall, $e advisor
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3425388