東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Mental causation and the problem of ...

Churchill, John.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion./
Author:	Churchill, John.
Description:	204 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-11A.
Subject:	Philosophy of Science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3423572
ISBN:	9781124246116

Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion.
Churchill, John.

Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion. - 204 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2010.

The assumption that mental events are causally efficacious is of great consequence, as our standing as morally responsible agents plausibly requires that our behavior be causally influenced by our beliefs, desires, decisions, etc. And this assumption enjoys a consensus in both ordinary practice and scientific practice (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) alike.

ISBN: 9781124246116Subjects--Topical Terms:

894954
Philosophy of Science.

Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion.
LDR:03349nam 2200373 4500 001 1394608
005 20110429092907.5
008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124246116
035 $a (UMI)AAI3423572
035 $a AAI3423572
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Churchill, John. $3 1673242
245 1 0 $a Mental causation and the problem of causal exclusion.
300 $a 204 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Timothy O'Connor.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2010.
520 $a The assumption that mental events are causally efficacious is of great consequence, as our standing as morally responsible agents plausibly requires that our behavior be causally influenced by our beliefs, desires, decisions, etc. And this assumption enjoys a consensus in both ordinary practice and scientific practice (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) alike.
520 $a However, the assumption is challenged by another, prima facie plausible commitment, namely that our behavior can in principle be completely causally accounted for by certain physical factors---microphysical or chemical factors, for example. If this is true, and mental events are distinct from such physical factors, then unless we wish to countenance a cosmic coincidence, whereby each mentally-caused bit of behavior somehow ends up having a complete non-mental cause to boot, we ought not to claim that mental events are causes of our actions.
520 $a Of course, if mental events were identical to certain of the physical events that cause behavior, then this would secure the efficacy of the mind. But I argue that this reductive proposal is untenable, as it ultimately requires the rejection of the very mental events that its proponents seek to vindicate.
520 $a I also contend that we should not accept the most popular contemporary response to the challenge, a response that turns on treating mental causation itself as a reducible relation. For this approach, seen aright, leads either to a kind of radical skepticism about mental causes and their effects, or else it makes the facts about these causes and effects a purely conventional matter.
520 $a Instead, I argue, we should reject the claim that physical factors are sufficient to cause the behavior we attribute to mental causes. Recent work in the philosophy of science, spanning investigation into biology, chemistry, and physics, supports a strong cumulative case against this claim. This warrants our rejection of the commitment that started all the trouble and vindicates the assumption that the mind is efficacious.
520 $a I close with the articulation and defense of an emergentist account of mental properties, a metaphysical framework that includes downwardly-efficacious mental events without reducing these events or their causal influence.
590 $a School code: 0093.
650 4 $a Philosophy of Science. $3 894954
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0402
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a Indiana University. $b Philosophy. $3 1028954
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-11A.
790 1 0 $a O'Connor, Timothy, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Cat, Jordi $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Schmitt, Frederick F. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Weinberg, Jonathan $e committee member
790 $a 0093
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3423572