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Essays on dynamic mechanisms.

Yilmaz, Murat.

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Essays on dynamic mechanisms.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on dynamic mechanisms./
作者:	Yilmaz, Murat.
面頁冊數:	111 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-12A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3430420
ISBN:	9781124297330

Essays on dynamic mechanisms.
Yilmaz, Murat.

Essays on dynamic mechanisms. - 111 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2011.

The first chapter considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a. discrete public good under incomplete information. There are two bidders with private valuations, and the cost of the public good is common knowledge. No bidder is willing to provide the good on his own. I show that a natural application of open ascending auctions in such environments fails dramatically: The probability of provision is zero in any equilibrium. I also consider an alternative mechanism in which the right to contribute first is sold in the first stage, and in the second stage players are playing a sequential contribution game with the order determined in the first stage. I show that under some conditions, this mechanism weakly outperforms the sequential contribution mechanism with exogenous order, in terms of the probability of provision.

ISBN: 9781124297330Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on dynamic mechanisms.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviesr: Barton L. Lipman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2011.
520 $a The first chapter considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a. discrete public good under incomplete information. There are two bidders with private valuations, and the cost of the public good is common knowledge. No bidder is willing to provide the good on his own. I show that a natural application of open ascending auctions in such environments fails dramatically: The probability of provision is zero in any equilibrium. I also consider an alternative mechanism in which the right to contribute first is sold in the first stage, and in the second stage players are playing a sequential contribution game with the order determined in the first stage. I show that under some conditions, this mechanism weakly outperforms the sequential contribution mechanism with exogenous order, in terms of the probability of provision.
520 $a In the second chapter, I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard, in which the agent has betadelta-preferences. I first analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting. Facing such an agent, it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period, relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time-consistent agent. I also consider the case where the agent is naive in the sense that he is not aware of his time-inconsistency. I show that the principal's maximum utility is the same from a sophisticated agent and a naive agent.
520 $a The third chapter analyzes open innovation projects and their effects on incentives for innovation. We model basic features of the General Public License (GPL), one of the most popular open source licenses and study how firms behave under this license. Under GPL, a trade-off is present between stimulating innovation and promoting disclosure. By using the open source, a firm can increase its probability of innovation success and its expected profit in that period. However, any innovation using open source would also be open source in subsequent periods. This obligation decreases the expected future revenue of the firm.
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