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Knowing What is Good For You = A The...

Taylor, Tim.

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Knowing What is Good For You = A Theory of Prudential Value and Well-being.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Knowing What is Good For You/
其他題名:	A Theory of Prudential Value and Well-being.
作者:	Taylor, Tim.
其他作者:	Taylor, Dr Tim.
出版者:	Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan, : 2011.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (211 p.)
附註:	Description based upon print version of record.
內容註:	Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Setting the Scene; A. Aims; The enumerative question and the explanatory questions; Functional and descriptive adequacy; B. Well-being and prudential value; Definition and use; Where to start?; The nature of prudential value; C. Criteria; 2 The Main Contenders; A. The subjective/objective distinction; B. Subjective theories; Hedonism/mental-state theories; Happiness/life-satisfaction accounts; Desire-satisfaction accounts; C. Objective theories; Aristotelian theories; Objective-list accounts; D. Other theories
內容註:	Hybrid or intermediate accountsFunctionings and capabilities; 3 Objective or Subjective?; A. Arguments in favour of the objective approach; The horizon problem; Conflicts with value intuitions; B. Arguments in favour of the subjective approach; The subjective intuition; Sumner's arguments; C. The possibility of a hybrid approach; D. Conclusions; 4 What Sort of Subjective Account?; A. Hedonism?; B. Desire-satisfaction?; The attitudinal model; Desire and the future: the disappointment problem; The pleasant surprise problem; Desire and the present/past; Direction of fit
內容註:	Broader notions of desireC. A third way; Subjective valuings; Subjective valuings and other states; Why value does not 'fall through' to the reasons why we value things; 5 Developing a New Subjective Account; A. How states of the world can have value; Does subjective valuing always confer value?; Idealised or filtered actual valuings?; A variant: valuing plus desire; B. How states of mind can have value; What kinds of states of mind?; Two part or unified account?; Unity at a deeper level?; Variation between individuals and cases; Conclusion; 6 Modifications to the Basic Approach
內容註:	A. The rationale for conditionsB. Scope conditions; Remoteness; Intrinsic vs. extrinsic; Subject's indifference; C. Information conditions; D. Authenticity conditions; E. Normative conditions; F. Conclusions; 7 Conflicts and Comparisons of Value; A. Conflicts; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively in different respects; Cases where a higher-order valuing has the opposite polarity to a lower-order one, or to a pleasure or pain; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively at different times; Complicating factors; B. Measurement; Ordinal comparisons
內容註:	What underlies 'strength'How far can we go in quantifying value?; C. Conclusions; 8 Well-Being; A. An account of well-being; A bottom-up account; The rivals: top-down approaches; B. Comparison and measurement of well-being; Principle; Practice; C. Conclusions; 9 Overview; A. Summary; B. How far have we succeeded?; Notes; Bibliography; Index;
標題:	Well-being. -
電子資源:	http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9780230359796
ISBN:	9780230359796 (electronic bk.)

Knowing What is Good For You = A Theory of Prudential Value and Well-being.
Taylor, Tim.

Knowing What is Good For YouA Theory of Prudential Value and Well-being.[electronic resource] : - Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,2011. - 1 online resource (211 p.)

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Setting the Scene; A. Aims; The enumerative question and the explanatory questions; Functional and descriptive adequacy; B. Well-being and prudential value; Definition and use; Where to start?; The nature of prudential value; C. Criteria; 2 The Main Contenders; A. The subjective/objective distinction; B. Subjective theories; Hedonism/mental-state theories; Happiness/life-satisfaction accounts; Desire-satisfaction accounts; C. Objective theories; Aristotelian theories; Objective-list accounts; D. Other theories

An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyses competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.

ISBN: 9780230359796 (electronic bk.)

Source: 485058Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

604202
Well-being.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: BF575.H27 / T39 2011

Dewey Class. No.: 171.3

Knowing What is Good For You = A Theory of Prudential Value and Well-being.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $a Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Setting the Scene; A. Aims; The enumerative question and the explanatory questions; Functional and descriptive adequacy; B. Well-being and prudential value; Definition and use; Where to start?; The nature of prudential value; C. Criteria; 2 The Main Contenders; A. The subjective/objective distinction; B. Subjective theories; Hedonism/mental-state theories; Happiness/life-satisfaction accounts; Desire-satisfaction accounts; C. Objective theories; Aristotelian theories; Objective-list accounts; D. Other theories
505 8 $a Hybrid or intermediate accountsFunctionings and capabilities; 3 Objective or Subjective?; A. Arguments in favour of the objective approach; The horizon problem; Conflicts with value intuitions; B. Arguments in favour of the subjective approach; The subjective intuition; Sumner's arguments; C. The possibility of a hybrid approach; D. Conclusions; 4 What Sort of Subjective Account?; A. Hedonism?; B. Desire-satisfaction?; The attitudinal model; Desire and the future: the disappointment problem; The pleasant surprise problem; Desire and the present/past; Direction of fit
505 8 $a Broader notions of desireC. A third way; Subjective valuings; Subjective valuings and other states; Why value does not 'fall through' to the reasons why we value things; 5 Developing a New Subjective Account; A. How states of the world can have value; Does subjective valuing always confer value?; Idealised or filtered actual valuings?; A variant: valuing plus desire; B. How states of mind can have value; What kinds of states of mind?; Two part or unified account?; Unity at a deeper level?; Variation between individuals and cases; Conclusion; 6 Modifications to the Basic Approach
505 8 $a A. The rationale for conditionsB. Scope conditions; Remoteness; Intrinsic vs. extrinsic; Subject's indifference; C. Information conditions; D. Authenticity conditions; E. Normative conditions; F. Conclusions; 7 Conflicts and Comparisons of Value; A. Conflicts; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively in different respects; Cases where a higher-order valuing has the opposite polarity to a lower-order one, or to a pleasure or pain; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively at different times; Complicating factors; B. Measurement; Ordinal comparisons
505 8 $a What underlies 'strength'How far can we go in quantifying value?; C. Conclusions; 8 Well-Being; A. An account of well-being; A bottom-up account; The rivals: top-down approaches; B. Comparison and measurement of well-being; Principle; Practice; C. Conclusions; 9 Overview; A. Summary; B. How far have we succeeded?; Notes; Bibliography; Index;
520 $a An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyses competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.
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650 0 $a Value. $3 571596
650 7 $a PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy $2 bisacsh $3 1599087
655 4 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
700 1 $a Taylor, Dr Tim. $3 1601213
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856 4 0 $3 Palgrave Connect $u http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9780230359796
994 $a C0 $b TEF