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Understanding general deterrence = t...

Quackenbush, Stephen L.

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Understanding general deterrence = theory and application /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Understanding general deterrence/ Stephen L. Quackenbush.
其他題名:	theory and application /
作者:	Quackenbush, Stephen L.
出版者:	New York :Palgrave Macmillan, : 2011.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) :ill.
內容註:	Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.
內容註:	Understanding general deterrence -- General deterrence case selection -- Testing perfect deterrence theory -- Three-party extended deterrence -- Settlements, deterrence, and recurrent conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN program used to determine active dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame perfect equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game.
標題:	Conflict management. -
電子資源:	http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9780230370791
ISBN:	9780230370791 (electronic bk.)

Understanding general deterrence = theory and application /
Quackenbush, Stephen L.

Understanding general deterrencetheory and application /[electronic resource] :Stephen L. Quackenbush. - 1st ed. - New York :Palgrave Macmillan,2011. - 1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) :ill.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-201) and index.

Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.

This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.

ISBN: 9780230370791 (electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 9786613381811

Source: 566196Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

536040
Conflict management.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: JZ6368 / .Q33 2011

Dewey Class. No.: 355.02

Understanding general deterrence = theory and application /
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250 $a 1st ed.
260 $a New York : $b Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2011.
300 $a 1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) : $b ill.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-201) and index.
505 0 $a Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.
505 0 $a Understanding general deterrence -- General deterrence case selection -- Testing perfect deterrence theory -- Three-party extended deterrence -- Settlements, deterrence, and recurrent conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN program used to determine active dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame perfect equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game.
520 $a This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.
520 $a "This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence."--Provided by publisher.
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650 7 $a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science $2 bisacsh $3 1599054
655 4 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
776 0 8 $i Print version: $a Quackenbush, Stephen L. $t Understanding general deterrence. $b 1st ed. $d New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 $z 9780230115040 $w (DLC) 2011017517 $w (OCoLC)704384760
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