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The attentional shaping of perceptua...

Marchi, Francesco.

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The attentional shaping of perceptual experience = an investigation into attention and cognitive penetrability /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The attentional shaping of perceptual experience/ by Francesco Marchi.
其他題名:	an investigation into attention and cognitive penetrability /
作者:	Marchi, Francesco.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2020.,
面頁冊數:	xviii, 157 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Chapter 1. A Play with Two Characters: Perception and Cognition -- Chapter 2. The Cognitive Processing Hierarchy -- Chapter 3. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience -- Chapter 4. Attention and the Shaping of Experience -- Chapter 5. Toward a Theory of Attention -- Chapter 6. How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works -- Chapter 7. Expectations and Predictions as a Model of Cognition -- Chapter 8. A Predictive Model of Attentional Cognitive Penetration.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Perception. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33558-8
ISBN:	9783030335588

The attentional shaping of perceptual experience = an investigation into attention and cognitive penetrability /
Marchi, Francesco.

The attentional shaping of perceptual experiencean investigation into attention and cognitive penetrability /[electronic resource] :by Francesco Marchi. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020. - xviii, 157 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Studies in brain and mind,v.161573-4536 ;. - Studies in brain and mind ;v.16..

Chapter 1. A Play with Two Characters: Perception and Cognition -- Chapter 2. The Cognitive Processing Hierarchy -- Chapter 3. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience -- Chapter 4. Attention and the Shaping of Experience -- Chapter 5. Toward a Theory of Attention -- Chapter 6. How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works -- Chapter 7. Expectations and Predictions as a Model of Cognition -- Chapter 8. A Predictive Model of Attentional Cognitive Penetration.

This monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or even forming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification. The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process.

ISBN: 9783030335588

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-33558-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

527749
Perception.

LC Class. No.: BF311 / .M373 2020

Dewey Class. No.: 152.1

The attentional shaping of perceptual experience = an investigation into attention and cognitive penetrability /
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