東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on Behavioral Game Theory.

Butler, Nicholas O.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on Behavioral Game Theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Behavioral Game Theory./
作者:	Butler, Nicholas O.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	162 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10283295
ISBN:	9780355041156

Essays on Behavioral Game Theory.
Butler, Nicholas O.

Essays on Behavioral Game Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 162 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2017.

This dissertation addresses a collection of problems concerning the interpretation and technical properties of solution concepts in dynamic behavioral games. In particular it introduces a geometric characterization of perfect recall, a novel framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings with interdependent strategic constraints, and a collection of novel solution concepts for games with imperfect recall. This geometric characterization of perfect recall reveals the reason for non-existence of equilibria in games with imperfect recall. In addition, mixed behavioral strategies are shown to nontrivially extend the set of equilibria in games with imperfect recall, and guarantee the existence of equilibria in any finite extensive form game. In conjunction, these results indicate that mixed behavioral strategies are the most natural class of strategies in general extensive form games. The concept of an extensive form generalized game, a novel framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings with interdependent strategic constraints is introduced, and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria in mixed, behavioral, and mixed behavioral strategies in this setting are provided, including a generalization of perfect recall. Various existing behaviorally motivated strategic models, including games with rationally inattentive players, are contained within this framework. Finally, the notion of sophisticated sequentially rational equilibrium, a novel alternative to Nash equilibrium in extensive form games with imperfect recall is introduced. Intuitively, instead of being fixed ex-ante, the beliefs of sophisticated sequentially rational players are dynamically updated following a deviation. While sophisticated sequentially rational equilibria coincide with Nash equilibria in games with perfect recall, they do not in games with imperfect recall. Since sophisticated sequential rationality is more natural than ex-ante optimality provided players are rational, sophisticated, and dynamically update their beliefs, sophisticated sequentially rational equilibria are interpretatively preferable to Nash equilibria in games with imperfect recall.

ISBN: 9780355041156Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Behavioral Game Theory.
LDR:03060nmm a2200289 4500 001 2201584
005 20190429091133.5
008 201008s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355041156
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10283295
035 $a (MiAaPQ)princeton:12139
035 $a AAI10283295
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Butler, Nicholas O. $3 3428301
245 1 0 $a Essays on Behavioral Game Theory.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 162 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Wolfgang Pesendorfer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2017.
520 $a This dissertation addresses a collection of problems concerning the interpretation and technical properties of solution concepts in dynamic behavioral games. In particular it introduces a geometric characterization of perfect recall, a novel framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings with interdependent strategic constraints, and a collection of novel solution concepts for games with imperfect recall. This geometric characterization of perfect recall reveals the reason for non-existence of equilibria in games with imperfect recall. In addition, mixed behavioral strategies are shown to nontrivially extend the set of equilibria in games with imperfect recall, and guarantee the existence of equilibria in any finite extensive form game. In conjunction, these results indicate that mixed behavioral strategies are the most natural class of strategies in general extensive form games. The concept of an extensive form generalized game, a novel framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings with interdependent strategic constraints is introduced, and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria in mixed, behavioral, and mixed behavioral strategies in this setting are provided, including a generalization of perfect recall. Various existing behaviorally motivated strategic models, including games with rationally inattentive players, are contained within this framework. Finally, the notion of sophisticated sequentially rational equilibrium, a novel alternative to Nash equilibrium in extensive form games with imperfect recall is introduced. Intuitively, instead of being fixed ex-ante, the beliefs of sophisticated sequentially rational players are dynamically updated following a deviation. While sophisticated sequentially rational equilibria coincide with Nash equilibria in games with perfect recall, they do not in games with imperfect recall. Since sophisticated sequential rationality is more natural than ex-ante optimality provided players are rational, sophisticated, and dynamically update their beliefs, sophisticated sequentially rational equilibria are interpretatively preferable to Nash equilibria in games with imperfect recall.
590 $a School code: 0181.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a Princeton University. $b Economics. $3 2093738
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-11A(E).
790 $a 0181
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10283295