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A critical examination of Hilary Put...

Buechner, Jeff.

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A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism./
Author:	Buechner, Jeff.
Description:	313 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2111.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-06A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3092920

A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism.
Buechner, Jeff.

A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism. - 313 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2111.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 2003.

In his seminal work, <italic>Representation and Reality</italic> and elsewhere in publications throughout the 1980's and 1990's, Hilary Putnam attempts an ingenious refutation of computational functionalism. His refutation centers upon three main pillars: the use of the Gödel incompleteness theorems, his precise articulation of a triviality thesis and his argument that there can be no local computational reductions (because there can be no computable equivalence relations defined over the infinitely or infeasibly large set of computational realizations of arbitrary intentional states).Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism.
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035 $a (UnM)AAI3092920
035 $a AAI3092920
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Buechner, Jeff. $3 921907
245 1 0 $a A critical examination of Hilary Putnam's refutation of computational functionalism.
300 $a 313 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2111.
500 $a Director: Mary Frances Egan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 2003.
520 $a In his seminal work, <italic>Representation and Reality</italic> and elsewhere in publications throughout the 1980's and 1990's, Hilary Putnam attempts an ingenious refutation of computational functionalism. His refutation centers upon three main pillars: the use of the Gödel incompleteness theorems, his precise articulation of a triviality thesis and his argument that there can be no local computational reductions (because there can be no computable equivalence relations defined over the infinitely or infeasibly large set of computational realizations of arbitrary intentional states).
520 $a We argue that each pillar is riddled with severe problems. His rescue of the Gödel incompleteness theorems from the logical error committed by J. R. Lucas and Roger Penrose comes only at the expense of his argument succumbing to a paradox. His triviality theorem commits a modal error and faces a Kripke-Wittgenstein problem. We also show that both John Searle's metaphysics of computation and current triviality arguments fail to respect theorems of computability and computational complexity theory. We demonstrate, by a relative consistency proof, that computational ism is not committed to metaphysical realism and escapes Quinean indeterminacy and ontological relativity. The demonstration is relative to the success of Putnamian epistemic semantics. We argue that Putnam's no-local-computational-reduction claim (i) amounts to nothing more than a claim that inductive reasoning cannot be formalized, (ii) that it erroneously saddles computationalism with radical Quinean meaning holism and that (iii) he fails to take into account well-known work in mathematical logic, cognitive science (e.g., Ugly Duckling theory) and artificial intelligence.
590 $a School code: 0190.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0422
710 2 0 $a Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick. $3 1017590
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-06A.
790 1 0 $a Egan, Mary Frances, $e advisor
790 $a 0190
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3092920