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The politics of central bank reform:...

Hicks, Raymond.

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The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics./
作者:	Hicks, Raymond.
面頁冊數:	316 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: A, page: 0679.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-02A.
標題:	Political Science, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3123331
ISBN:	0496706421

The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics.
Hicks, Raymond.

The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics. - 316 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: A, page: 0679.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2004.

Since the late 1980s, governments in more than 40 countries have made their central banks more independent from the political process. I argue that three factors explain the decision to reform a central bank: partisanship, political institutions, and exposure to the international economy. Because central bankers prefer lower inflation to lower unemployment, leftist parties prefer a more dependent central bank and conservative parties a more independent one. Political institutions affect the preferences of conservative parties since multiple veto players---actors in the political process who can halt policy---make independence more secure and tie the hands of their leftist opponents. With a single veto player, a conservative party's opponents can decrease the level of independence, so it is more difficult time to tie the hands of the left. Finally, as a country's exposure to the international economy increases, leftist parties prefer a more independent central bank in order to gain credibility with international investors. A more independent bank represents a commitment to the neoliberal policies preferred by investors so there is less likelihood that investors will flee a country with a leftist government. Similarly, as globalization increases, conservative parties, even in multiple veto player systems, will avoid reforming the central bank for fear of helping their leftist opponents.

ISBN: 0496706421Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics.
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245 1 4 $a The politics of central bank reform: The role of institution, partisanship, and international economics.
300 $a 316 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: A, page: 0679.
500 $a Adviser: Eric Reinhardt.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2004.
520 $a Since the late 1980s, governments in more than 40 countries have made their central banks more independent from the political process. I argue that three factors explain the decision to reform a central bank: partisanship, political institutions, and exposure to the international economy. Because central bankers prefer lower inflation to lower unemployment, leftist parties prefer a more dependent central bank and conservative parties a more independent one. Political institutions affect the preferences of conservative parties since multiple veto players---actors in the political process who can halt policy---make independence more secure and tie the hands of their leftist opponents. With a single veto player, a conservative party's opponents can decrease the level of independence, so it is more difficult time to tie the hands of the left. Finally, as a country's exposure to the international economy increases, leftist parties prefer a more independent central bank in order to gain credibility with international investors. A more independent bank represents a commitment to the neoliberal policies preferred by investors so there is less likelihood that investors will flee a country with a leftist government. Similarly, as globalization increases, conservative parties, even in multiple veto player systems, will avoid reforming the central bank for fear of helping their leftist opponents.
520 $a Evidence from quantitative and qualitative tests strongly support the international hypotheses but offer less support for the veto players hypotheses. As globalization increases, leftist governments are significantly more likely to reform the central bank. While the effect of veto players is occasionally significant, the case studies suggest a somewhat stronger role. The British Labour government worried that the next Conservative government would reverse the reform of the Bank of England while, in Brazil, presidents Cardoso and Lula could not pass central bank reform legislation through Congress because of the latter's fragmented nature.
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